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The Tax Penalty On 
Marriage
An Odious Wedding Gift
By John M. Strefeler
The tax penalty on marriage, or 
“sin subsidy’’ as it has sometimes 
been labeled, is a quirk in the federal 
tax system that appeared inadvert­
ently as Congress went about its 
business of amending the Internal 
Revenue Code. The essence of the 
problem is that circumstances exist 
in which a married couple must pay 
more tax than an identical but un­
married couple would pay on the 
same quantity of taxable income.
Consider a working couple who 
each had a 1980 taxable income of 
$30,000. If they were single in­
dividuals, they would each have had 
a 1980 tax liability of $7,962, and 
their combined federal income tax 
would have been $15,924. If they had 
been married, however, their tax ex­
penses would have increased to 
$19,678. Some quick arithmetic 
would show that their wedding pres­
ent from Uncle Sam would have 
been a healthy 23.6 percent increase 
in their tax liability.
The Economic Recovery Tax Act 
of 1981 has provided for a partial 
correction of the marriage tax prob­
lem, in the form of a special tax 
deduction which is available to mar­
ried couples who both work. Recon­
sidering the previous example but 
using the tax provisions as they 
would apply for 1984, a single in­
dividual with $30,000 of taxable in­
come would incur a tax of $6,113. 
Thus, an unmarried couple would 
have a tax liability of $12,226 if each 
had $30,000 of taxable income. As a 
married couple with the same total 
income, their income tax would 
amount to $14,028 and they would 
still suffer a marriage penalty of 
$1,802. Even after the recent amend­
ments to the tax law, then, this cou­
ple would be subject to a 14.7 per­
cent tax increase because of the 
decision to get married.
Present Situation 
Of Controversy
The presence of the marriage 
penalty gained notoriety about six 
years ago when the news media 
published stories concerning mar­
ried couples who were divorcing 
near the end of the year so they 
could file tax returns as unmarried 
individuals, and who would then 
remarry early in the following year. 
Such a strategy was designed to 
take advantage of the tax rule that 
marital status is determined at the 
end of the taxable year [Sec. 143 (a) 
(1)]. A typical case would involve a 
couple flying to a foreign destination 
late in the year to get a divorce and 
to spend the holidays vacationing. 
They would return home after the 
first of the year and remarry, paying 
for the trip with their tax savings. 
This growing practice and the con­
sequent bad publicity proved to be 
intolerable to the Internal Revenue 
Service. In 1976, the IRS indicated in 
Revenue Ruling 76-255 [1976-2 C.B. 
40] that such tax avoidance efforts 
would not be recognized. The IRS 
characterized these tactics as sham 
transactions and argued that a 
divorce “should not be given any 
effect for Federal income tax pur­
poses if it merely serves the purpose 
of tax avoidance.”
Recently, the validity of this ruling 
was contested by a Maryland couple 
who were assessed back taxes when 
the IRS refused to recognize their 
divorce-and-remarriage approach to 
tax planning [Boyter, 74 T.C. 989]. 
David and Angela Boyter were 
among the many married taxpayers 
to find themselves penalized 
because of their marital status. In 
response to this situation, they ob­
tained a divorce in Haiti in Decem­
ber 1975, remarried in Maryland in 
January 1976, and filed as unmar­
ried taxpayers for 1975. Substan­
tially the same process was repeated 
one year later, with the divorce this 
time obtained in the Dominican 
Republic. Again for 1976 the tax­
payers filed as unmarried in­
dividuals.
The IRS offered multiple argu­
ments in court as to why the Boyters 
should be treated as married in­
dividuals for tax purposes. The first 
argument, that Maryland would not 
recognize these divorces as valid 
because the foreign courts did not 
have jurisdiction, was found to be 
persuasive. Since this argument was 
dispositive of the issue, the Tax 
Court did not respond to the other 
arguments. This is unfortunate as 
the IRS maintained as another argu­
ment that the divorces should be ig­
nored “because a year-end divorce 
whereby the parties intend to and do 
in fact remarry early in the next year 
is a sham transaction ..The result 
of the Boyter case, then, was to nar­
row the potential path for tax savings 
through divorce-and-remarriage, but 
to leave the underlying dispute as to 
the validity of Rev. Rul. 76-255 unset­
tled. At least one article has sug-
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What caused the tax law's 
unintended consequences for 
marriage partners?
gested that the sham transaction 
doctrine may be ill-suited for ap­
plicability to year-end divorces 
[Michigan Law Review (Editorial 
Board), 1979].
Meanwhile, the IRS has given its 
approval to another couple who ex­
tended this approach an additional 
step [Ltr. Rul. 7835076 No. 2956(78) 
P-H Private Letter Rulings]. This 
couple was married in 1976 and, 
although still compatible, they plan­
ned to obtain a valid divorce in their 
state of residence. The only change 
would be a legal one, since they 
would continue to live together and 
to carry on their life just as they had 
before. The sole reason for their 
divorce was the potential tax sav­
ings, but the IRS nevertheless ac­
cepted the tax implications of their 
intended course of action. Since the 
divorce would remain in effect for all 
legal purposes, it could not be con­
strued as a sham and the IRS found 
no basis upon which to deny unmar­
ried status to the couple.
Such legal maneuvering seems in­
credible in the absence of any Con­
gressional intent to influence per­
sonal decisions regarding marriage. 
How, then, can one account for this 
unintended consequence of the 
federal income tax? The answer 
seems to lie in two historical 
developments — one involving the 
tax system itself and the other con­
cerning the increasing number of 
two income families in the American 
economy.
History Leading To The 
Current Situation
Until 1948, marital status was rela­
tively unimportant because everyone 
used the same set of tax rates. The 
assumptions on which the tax 
system was based (that the in­
dividual should be the basic taxpay­
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ing entity and that differing family 
situations could be amply provided 
for through the use of exemptions) 
had seemed to work well. One 
reason for this success may have 
been that prior to World War II the 
exemption was viewed as a vehicle 
to exclude from taxation enough in­
come to provide adequate support 
for a family. The resulting high dollar 
amount of exemptions meant that 
only a small percentage of the 
population was affected by the in­
come tax.
After World War II, a major in­
equity in what had grown into an all 
pervasive income tax became evi­
dent. The single tax rate system pro­
vided an unintended tax advantage 
to taxpayers who resided in com­
munity property states.1
1Most states were common law states; that 
is, they derived their legal code from English 
common law. Eight states (Arizona, Califor­
nia, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, 
Texas, and Washington) based their property 
rights instead on community property rules.
2The author acknowledges the detailed 
work of Alan Hee, University of Hawaii gradu­
ate assistant, in researching and helping to 
write this section.
3Labor force participation rate = number of 
married women (husband present in the 
household) in the labor force divided by the 
civilian population of married women (husband 
present).
In common law states, income is 
attributed to the individual who per­
forms the services or who owns the 
property which is responsible for the 
income generation. The typical 
situation in the 1940’s was for the 
husband to be the breadwinner of 
the family and for the wife to be the 
homemaker. Thus, whether the mar­
ried couple filed a joint return or sep­
arate returns, all of the income 
would go on one return and be sub­
ject to the full brunt of the 
progressive tax rates.
In contrast, income in community 
property states is earned equally by 
marriage partners regardless of 
which spouse actually performed the 
services. Income generated by com­
munity property would also be allo­
cated equally to husband and wife. 
The result was that married couples 
in community property states could 
save taxes by filing separate returns, 
with each reporting one-half of the 
total income. They would have the 
advantage of moving through the 
lower tax brackets twice — once on 
each return.
This lesson was not lost on the 
American taxpayer. Residents of 
common law states turned to their 
state legislatures and soon a num­
ber of common law states 
(Oklahoma and Michigan, for exam­
ple) were in the process of changing 
their property rights laws. This unin­
tended effect of the tax system led 
Congress to enact a provision in the 
Revenue Act of 1948 which allowed 
married taxpayers filing joint returns 
to split their income, thus giving the 
advantage of income splitting to all 
taxpayers regardless of their state of 
residence.
The other change in the tax law 
which filled in the missing piece to 
create the marriage penalty began 
to unfold in 1969. Unmarried tax­
payers appealed to Congress con­
cerning the differential in tax rates 
which existed between single and 
married taxpayers. At that time, a 
single person could pay up to 41 per­
cent more tax than a married couple 
with the same total income. Con­
gress responded by lowering the 
rates for single taxpayers effective in 
1971; the new rates limited the ex­
cess that a single individual would 
pay to 20 percent above the tax of a 
married couple. Furthermore, to pre­
vent married persons from frustrat­
ing the intent of the law by electing 
to file separately and use the new 
rates for singles, Congress limited 
the new Schedule X to single tax­
payers. Married persons were re­
quired to continue to use Schedule 
Y, with separate rate structures for 
joint returns and separate returns. 
Thus, the single and married-filing- 
separately rate structures were no 
longer combined and the marriage 
penalty appeared.
Emergence Of The 
Two-Income Family2
While the tax system was evolving 
so that the potential of a marriage 
tax was present, changes in Ameri­
can society made the marriage tax 
more widespread in its application. 
The primary change has been the in­
creasing number and percentage of 
wives in the labor force. In 1950, 8.5 
million wives were in the labor force, 
representing a labor force participa­
tion rate3 of 23.8 percent [Schiffman, 
1960]. By contrast, the number of 
working wives in 1979 totaled 23.8 
million for a participation rate of 49.4 
percent [Johnson, 1980].
TABLE 1
Marriage Bonus (+ ) And Marriage Penalty (- ) 
Under ERTA (1980) Tax Provisions
WIFE’S ADJUSTED 
GROSS INCOME
HUSBAND’S ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME
50,000 + 3,344 + 1,144 - 379 - 1,691 - 2,699 - 3,474 - 4,014 - 4,314 - 4,369 - 4,394 - 4,394
45,000 + 3,126 + 1,094 - 429 - 1,711 - 2,699 - 3,474 - 4,014 - 4,314 - 4,369 - 4,394 - 4,394
40,000 + 2,801 + 901 - 454 - 1,736 - 2,694 - 3,449 - 3,989 - 4,289 - 4,344 - 4,369 - 4,369
35,000 + 2,374 + 606 - 617 - 1,731 - 2,689 - 3,414 - 3,934 - 4,234 - 4,289 - 4,314 - 4,314
30,000 + 1,929 + 424 - 667 - 1,649 - 2,439 - 3,164 - 3,654 - 3,934 - 3,989 - 4,014 - 4,014
25,000 + 1,505 + 219 - 609 - 1,459 - 2,117 - 2,674 - 3,164 - 3,414 - 3,449 - 3,474 - 3,474
20,000 + 1,092 + 30 - 579 - 1,166 - 1,692 - 2,117 - 2,439 - 2,689 - 2,694 - 2,699 - 2,699
15,000 + 710 - 150 - 535 - 903 - 1,166 - 1,459 - 1,649 - 1,731 - 1,736 - 1,711 - 1,691
10,000 + 475 - 208 - 391 - 535 - 579 - 609 - 667 - 617 - 454 - 429 - 379
5,000 + 250 - 202 - 208 - 150 + 30 + 219 + 424 + 606 + 901 + 1,094 + 1,144
0 + 0 + 250 + 475 + 710 + 1,092 + 1,505 + 1,929 + 2,374 + 2,801 + 3,126 + 3,344
0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000 45,000 50,000
Table assumes no dependents and that deductions are not itemized
The increase in two-earner 
families is partially due to the failure 
of real income to maintain the 
growth rate which had occurred in 
the early post-war period. Between 
1947 and 1962, the annual real wage 
gain averaged about 2.5 percent, 
almost three times the annual in­
crease in the years since 1962. The 
erosion is attributable to the decline 
in productivity rates among Ameri­
can workers and to the sharp in­
crease in inflation over this period 
[Douty, 1977]. The continuation of 
these trends seem certain to make 
the two-income family an in­
creasingly common fixture in Ameri­
can society.
Another factor which influences 
the labor participation rate among 
wives is the presence of children. 
Wives are more likely to work if there 
are no school-age or pre-school 
children in the household. Following 
World War II, many married women 
were involved in caring for children 
during this period of high birth rates. 
Beginning in the late 1960’s, 
however, the number of working 
wives accelerated. This trend con­
tinued during the 1970’s as declining 
birth rates resulted in fewer children 
to raise. Thus, the changing 
character of the family household 
explains much of the increase in 
working wives [Slater, 1979].
Dimension Of The Marriage 
Penalty Prior To ERTA
All married couples have not 
suffered the burden of the marriage 
tax. When all or the vast proportion 
of income was generated by one of 
the parties, there was no penalty and 
in fact there was a tax savings. This 
is seen for 1980 as the positive zone 
of Table 1. A tax savings of $2,801 
existed, for example, if a married 
couple had $40,000 of taxable in­
come which was generated entirely 
by one spouse.
On the other hand, Table 1 also 
reveals that the marriage penalty 
was not limited to a narrow income 
range and that the amount of tax 
differential could be substantial. The 
two-career family would fall into the 
penalty area in almost every in­
stance. If the previous example were 
altered by assuming that the income 
was equally divided between the 
spouses, the tax savings would be 
replaced by a $1,692 penalty.
Table 2 provides additional detail 
about the situation in which both in­
comes were equal, which was where 
the marriage penalty was most ex­
treme. In particular, it emphasizes 
how broad and deep the marriage 
tax had become. The penalty is 
already evident at the $4,000 level of 
taxable income. Two single persons 
splitting this income would have had 
no tax liability, while a married cou­
ple would have owed $84 of income 
taxes. At a taxable income of $84,000 
the marriage tax reached its max­
imum for wages and other forms of 
personal service income; a married
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TABLE 2
Marriage Penalty 
Under Pre-ERTA (1980) Tax Provisions 























couple would have paid $4,394 of 
additional taxes.4
4Prior to 1981, the maximum tax rules gave 
a preference to personal service income. Per­
sonal service income was subject to a max­
imum marginal rate of 50 percent. Other in­
come could be taxed at rates as high as 70 
percent, which would have caused the mar­
riage penalty to be even greater. For a mar­
ried couple with $100,000 of income which 
was not personal service income, for exam­
ple, the marriage penalty would have been 
$5,864 if the income were earned equally. The 
pre-1981 examples in this article assume per­
sonal service income as a matter of 
simplicity. The Economic Recovery Act of 
1981 lowered the top tax bracket to 50 per­
cent for all income, thus ending the tax dis­
tinction between personal service income 
and passive income.
Causes Of The 
Marriage Penalty
The primary cause of the marriage 
tax has been the differentiating 
among taxpayers by means of the 
tax rate structure; married couples 
have been denied use of the same 
tax rates as were available to unmar­
ried taxpayers. They must instead 
use either the married-filing-sepa­
rately schedule in which the 
progressive rates rise more rapidly, 
or use the married-filing jointly 
schedule which has brackets twice 
as wide but which taxes the income 
as one bundle and thus stacks the 
income of one spouse on top of the 
income of the other.
A contributing factor has been the 
standard deduction. A single in­
dividual may take a standard deduc­
tion (now called the zero bracket 
amount) of $2,300; two unmarried in­
dividuals would receive twice this 
amount, or $4,600, on their two 
returns. Were they married, they 
could take a combined standard 
deduction of only $3,400. Thus, 
being married could deprive a cou­
ple of $1,200 of deductions to which 
they would otherwise be entitled. 
This factor is unimportant to tax­
payers who itemize deductions, but 
well over half of all taxpayers do not 
itemize.
Effects Of The 
Marriage Penalty
While there is no indication that 
Congress intended to influence 
marital decisions through tax provi­
sions, several consequences derive 
from the lack of tax neutrality with 
respect to marital status.
One consequence of a marriage 
penalty is that it provides a disincen­
tive to marry and an incentive for 
married persons to divorce. How 
many of the small but growing num­
ber of couples who are unmarried 
and living together considered the 
marriage tax as one of their decision 
factors is unknown, but the financial 
implications can be substantial. It is 
also evident that those taxpayers 
who do forsake marriage for tax 
reasons have been very visible.
Another effect of a marriage 
penalty is that it operates as a work 
disincentive for married women rela­
tive to those who are single. The 
married woman finds that her in­
come is added to that of her husband 
and, while the tax brackets that she 
faces are twice as wide as those of 
her single counterpart, she does not 
receive the advantage of going 
through the lower brackets. Other 
things being equal, her after-tax 
earnings are lower than those of a 
single woman.
As an example, suppose two 
women were offered jobs with 1980 
salaries of $20,000. Circumstances 
were identical except that one 
woman was married to a man who 
earned a taxable income of $20,000 
per year, while the other was unmar­
ried and claimed the standard 
deduction. For the unmarried woman 
there would have been a $3,415 tax 
levied, while the tax on the income of 
her married counterpart would have 
been $7,001. The tax for the married 
woman thus would have been over 
twice the tax for the single women.
A third consequence is the risk 
that tax situations such as a mar­
riage penalty may undermine the 
perceived equity of the tax system 
and reduce the level of voluntary 
compliance. For those taxpayers 
who cannot or who choose not to 
use the marriage tax to their advan­
tage, the knowledge that others take 
advantage of the tax system in this 
contrived manner may cause them to 
regard the system as unfair. It is easy 
to envision such taxpayers cutting 
corners in other ways — unreported 
income and overstated deductions, 
for example — to even things out.
Treatment Of The Marriage 
Penalty— ERTA Changes
The approach to the problem of 
the marriage tax which was imple­
mented by the Economic Recovery 
Tax Act of 1981 is the provision of a 
deduction based upon the qualified 
earned income5 of the secondary 
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wage earner, such person being 
defined as the spouse who has the 
lesser amount of earnings in a par­
ticular year. This new deduction, 
allowed by new Sec. 221 of the Code, 
will be an adjustment to gross in­
come and thus available even for 
taxpayers who do not itemize their 
deductions. The deduction will equal 
five percent of the qualified earned 
income of the secondary wage 
earner in 1982, with a $30,000 limit 
on eligible qualified earned income. 
For years after 1982, the deduction 
will increase from five to ten percent 
of qualified earned income. The 
$30,000 ceiling will remain in effect, 
so that the maximum deduction will 
be $1,500 in 1982 and $3,000 for all 
subsequent years.
Using a deduction as the vehicle 
for alleviating the tax on the earn­
ings of the secondary wage earner is 
relatively simple and directly ad­
dresses the problem of the tax treat­
ment of secondary family income. 
Table 3 shows the status of the mar­
riage penalty for 1984, the first year 
that the full tax deductions under 
ERTA will be in effect; a comparison 
with Table 1 indicates the changes 
which will result. Obviously a deduc­
tion of this sort will reduce but not 
eliminate the tax penalty on mar­
riage. For example, the penalty on a 
married couple who each have ad­
justed gross incomes of $30,000 
would be reduced from $3,654 to 
$1,722 or by a total of $1,932.
A possible criticism of the deduc­
tion method is that it is not an even 
reduction for all two-earner couples. 
Since a deduction is beneficial in 
accordance with the marginal tax 
rates of taxpayers, the secondary in­
come deduction is of more value to 
married couples with higher in­
comes. While the married couple 
splitting $60,000 of income in the 
previous example was able to save 
$1,932, a couple evenly dividing 
$40,000 of adjusted gross income 
would gain only $1,044 in tax relief. 
In response to this criticism, 
however, it should be noted that the 
marriage penalty itself is most se-
5Qualified earned income is technically 
defined in ERTA. For example, it does not in­
clude retirement plan distributions, deferred 
compensation, or certain wages when one 
spouse is employed by the other. Also, com­
munity property laws are ignored so that 
earned income is attributed to the spouse 
who actually performs the services to earn 
the income.
vere for high-income families. Apply­
ing a judgment criterion of vertical 
equity does not seem appropriate, as 
the purpose of the provision is to 
seek equity in a different form — 
namely between two-earner married 
couples and two-earner unmarried 
couples. It may thus be argued that 
tax relief should be unequal since 
the underlying problem penalizes 
families unequally.
A further criticism of a deduction 
is that it does not resolve the un­
derlying issue of marriage neutrality. 
Both the marriage penalty and the 
marriage bonus continue to exist. 
Again looking at Tables 1 and 3, one 
can see that there has been no ap­
preciable change in the scope of the 
marriage tax. The size of the mar­
riage penalty has shrunk, but the 
penalty continues to occur in all of 
the squares where it had occurred 
prior to ERTA. A deduction, 
therefore, does not involve a 
theoretically consistent tax policy 
regarding the treatment of marital 
status. Sometimes couples are 
rewarded for being married; at other 
times they are penalized.
In defense of the deduction ap­
proach to alleviating the tax penalty 
on marriage, however, there is no 
simple proposal which would not 
suffer from significant drawbacks. 
An alternative which has a great 
deal of surface appeal, for example, 
is to allow married couples to file 
separate tax returns and use the tax 
rate schedule (and other tax rules) 
for single taxpayers. Such an elec­
tive filing technique would directly 
attack the objectionable symptom of 
the current tax system; married 
couples would be relieved of the 
marriage penalty by being allowed 
to use the tax rules for unmarried 
persons.
Unfortunately, this procedure 
would resurrect the inequitable 
treatment of unmarried persons. 
Consider a married couple with a 
1984 taxable income of $40,000 
divided equally between them. Their 
tax, if they each were to file as single 
persons, would total $6,410. An un­
married individual with $40,000 of 
taxable income would incur a tax of 
$9,749, an amount 52 percent higher 
than the tax of the married couple. 
This situation appears unacceptable 
when one recalls that in 1969 Con­
gress found a 41 percent difference 
to be objectionable.
Special deductions do not 
resolve the underlying issue of 
marriage neutrality.
Also, allowing married couples 
the option of filing separately is a 
one-sided solution to the issue. The 
marriage penalty is erased, but mar­
riage neutrality has not been 
achieved. The married couple whose 
income is derived entirely (or almost 
entirely) from one spouse would still 
enjoy a marriage bonus.
Another drawback of this proposal 
is that it would add complexity to the 
tax return preparation process. 
Many couples would have to com­
pute their taxes both ways to deter­
mine whether they would receive 
more advantage from income split­
ting on a joint return or from using 
the same standards as single per­
sons. This would involve three com­
putations — one for each spouse 
separately and one for the couple if 
they were to file jointly.
In the final analysis, then, the at­
tractiveness of the two-earner 
deduction is in its short-run and 
practical results rather than in a 
long-run theoretical justification. It 
reduces the marriage penalty im­
mediately and leaves a more con­
suming treatment of the issue to the 
future. One might regard it as a com­
panion to the relief of the single tax­
payer which was enacted as part of 
the Tax Reform Act of 1969. Just as 
that legislation dealt with the singles 
tax penalty not eliminating it but by 
reducing it to bounds which Con­
gress considered to be tolerable, so 
too the current deduction decreases 
the size of the marriage tax to what 
proponents might argue to be an 
acceptable level.
Conclusion
The essence of the marriage 
penalty is that in some situations a
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TABLE 3
Marriage Bonus (+) And Marriage Penalty (- ) 
Under ERTA (1984) Tax Provisions
WIFE’S ADJUSTED 
GROSS INCOME
50,000 + 2,861 + 1,344 + 356 - 528 - 1,274 - 1,844 - 2,226 - 2,630 - 2,830 - 3,062 - 3,212
45,000 + 2,521 + 1,144 + 156 - 668 - 1,274 - 1,844 - 2,226 - 2,630 - 2,830 - 2,930 - 3,062
40,000 + 2,171 + 879 + 56 - 768 - 1,334 - 1,744 - 2,126 - 2,530 - 2,730 - 2,830 - 2,830
35,000 + 1,727 + 629 - 134 - 768 - 1,334 - 1,724 - 1,946 - 2,330 - 2,530 - 2,630 - 2,630
30,000 + 1,458 + 448 - 180 - 779 - 1,130 - 1,520 - 1,722 - 1,946 - 2,126 - 2,226 - 2,226
25,000 + 1,152 + 268 - 198 - 670 - 978 - 1,143 - 1,520 - 1,724 - 1,744 - 1,844 - 1,844
20,000 + 844 + 135 - 205 - 492 - 648 - 978 - 1,130 - 1,334 - 1,334 - 1,274 - 1,274
15,000 + 540 17 - 177 - 338 - 492 - 670 - 779 - 768 - 768 - 668 - 528
10,000 + 376 - 73 - 91 - 177 - 205 - 198 - 180 - 134 - 56 - 156 - 356























HUSBAND’S ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME
Table assumes no dependents and that deductions are not itemized;
AGI figures are before the new two-earner deduction (to be consistent with Table 1)
couple pays more taxes by filing as a 
married couple than they would pay 
if they were to file as two single in­
dividuals. This unintended result of 
congressional tax changes has 
caused some couples to turn to 
divorce-and-remarriage or to 
divorce-and-living-together as a 
means of tax savings, with the latter 
technique being less risky in light of 
current IRS policy.
Some of the aspects of the mar­
riage tax which have made revision 
desirable are the disincentive for 
taxpayers to get or to remain mar­
ried, the disincentive for married 
women to work outside of the home, 
and the threat to the fairness of and 
respect for the tax system.
To alleviate the problem of the tax 
penalty on marriage, Congress 
enacted a two-earner deduction as 
part of the Economic Recovery Tax 
Act of 1981. This provision will, when 
fully phased in 1983, grant a 10 per­
cent deduction on the first $30,000 of 
earnings of the secondary wage 
earner. While not a comprehensive 
cure which eliminates the underly­
ing ailment, it is a treatment which 
relieves the most serious symptom 
until a more thorough approach to 
the issue can be mounted. As one 
author has noted somewhat 
philosophically, “we cannot ignore 
the opportunity to make small but 
positive changes while waiting for a 
massive tax reform which may never 
come.” [Rosen, 1977.]. Ω
REFERENCES
Douty, H.M. “The Slowdown in Real Wages: 
A Postwar Perspective.’’ Monthly Labor 
Review (Volume 100, August 1977), pp. 7 - 12.
Johnson, Beverly. “Marital and Family 
Characteristics of the Labor Force, March 
1979.’’ Monthly Labor Review (Volume 103, 
April 1980), pp. 48 - 52.
Michigan Law Review (Editorial Board). 
“The Haitian Vacation: The Applicability of 
Sham Doctrine to Year-end Divorces. 
Michigan Law Review (Vol. 77, No. 5, pp. 1332 
- 1354.
Rosen, Harvey S. “Is It Time to Abandon 
Joint Filing?” National Tax Journal Vol. XXX, 
No. 4), pp. 423 - 438.
Schiffman, Jacob. “Family Characteristics 
of Workers, 1959.” Monthly Labor Review 
(Volume 83, August 1960), pp. 828 - 836.
Slater, Courtenay, “Statistics Reveal Three 
Distinct Phases in Growth of Women in Labor 
Force.” Business America (Volume 2, March 
26, 1979), pp. 20-21.
John M. Strefeler, CPA, Ph.D., is 
associate professor of accounting at 
the University of Nevada-Reno. He 
was formerly with the faculty of the 
University of Hawaii, and holds mem­
bership in AAA, NAA, and the Na­
tional Tax Association-Tax Institute 
of America.
10/The Woman CPA, October, 1982
